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Abstract 
This paper presents a dynamic investment model of the international gas pipeline routings to 
the Turkish market. The model was developed by IIASA’s Dynamic Systems Project (DYN) and 
Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies Project (ECS) in 2000. To allow for user-friendly 
modeling, a professional software package “Investments in gas Pipelines Optimization of Returns” 
(IGOR) was developed which can also be used as a basis for models for related problems. Input 
data originated from various sources, in particular IIASA’s MESSAGE model. The paper analyzes 
model results under a wide range of future outcomes and includes comprehensive sensitivity 
analyses. The returns for five potential gas pipeline projects were analyzed for a wide range of 
values for the price elasticity of gas demand, GDP elasticity of gas demand and discount rates. The 
numerical results allow conclusions about gas price developments and optimal gas supply policies 
relative to the market parameters. 
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An economic model of international gas pipeline routings 
to the Turkish market – Numerical results for an uncertain future 
Olga Golovina∗, Ger Klaassen, and R. Alexander Roehrl 
1. Introduction 
The following extract from the United States Energy Information Administration’s country 
report on Turkey is an excellent summary of the political, economic, geographic, and 
environmental factors determining future gas pipeline routing to Turkey. It describes the situation 
as of July 2001: 
“There is no more perspective and capacious gas market in Asia and especially Caspian 
region today than Turkey. Turkey's energy consumption is growing much faster than its production, 
making Turkey a rapidly growing energy importer. Turkish natural gas demand is projected to 
increase rapidly in coming years, with the prime consumers expected to be power plants and 
industrial users. Natural gas is Turkey's preferred fuel for new power plant capacity for several 
reasons: environmental (gas is cleaner than coal, lignite, or oil); geographic (Turkey is close to 
huge amounts of gas in the Middle East and Central Asia); economic (Turkey could offset part of 
its energy import bill through transit fees it could charge for oil and gas shipments across its 
territory); and political (Turkey is seeking to strengthen relations with Caspian and Central Asian 
countries, several of which are potentially large gas exporters).  
Around 70% of current Turkish gas imports come from Russia via the trans-Balkan pipeline, 
with the other 30% coming mainly from Algeria and Nigeria via LNG tanker. Turkey has signed 
(or discussed) gas import deals with a variety of countries, including Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Russia, and Turkmenistan (see Figure 1). For gas exports beginning in 2004 around 40% is 
expected to come from Russia via Bulgaria, with 33% supplied from Russia via the Black Sea, 17% 
from Iran, and 8% from Azerbaijan. 
On December 15, 1997, Russia and Turkey signed a 25-year deal under which the Russian 
gas company, Gazprom, would construct a new gas export pipeline (called "Blue Stream") to 
Turkey for delivery capacity of around 565 Bcf annually, with initial deliveries possibly starting in 
2002. The $2.7-$3.2 billion, 758-mile dual pipeline is slated to run from Izobilnoye in southern 
Russia, to Dzhugba on the Black Sea, then under the Black Sea for about 247 miles to the Turkish 
port of Samsun, and on to Ankara. When completed, possibly by early 2002, the Blue Stream lines 
will be the world's deepest underwater gas pipelines, and will require complex engineering to 
construct the pipeline. The two main companies involved in Blue Stream are Russia's Gazprom and 
Italy's ENI SpA. 
Turkey's most controversial gas import deal is one with Iran, signed in 1996. Under this 23-
year arrangement, Iran will supply Turkey with gas, mainly from the Kangan gas field in the south 
and the Khangiran gas field in the northeast. Iran also imports gas from Turkmenistan, and could 
                                                 
∗
 This author was partially supported by the Russian Foundation of Basic Research under grant #00-01-00682 
2 
send spare volumes to Turkey as well. In January 2000, Turkey and Iran announced agreement on 
postponing the 23-year gas deal's start to July 2001, more than a year behind schedule, 
purportedly due to lack of completion of two pipeline stages in Turkey (U.S. opposition to Turkey's 
deal with Iran may also have been a factor). In late June 2001, the gas deal was delayed once 
again. But Turkey has steadfastly maintained that it needs to diversify its suppliers of natural gas 
away from Russia and that Turkmen and Iranian gas represent economically sound alternatives. 
 
Figure 1. Gas pipeline routes to Turkey (Source: Gas Matters) 
On May 21, 1999, Botas signed an agreement on building a $2-$2.4 billion, 1,050-mile, gas 
pipeline from Turkmenistan, underneath the Caspian Sea, across Azerbaijan and Georgia (both of 
which would collect transit fees), and on to Turkey. The consortium is led by U.S. company Bechtel 
and including General Electric, Shell, and PSG International. Despite previous Turkish 
government statements that a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan was a top priority, this now seems 
highly unlikely, as it would compete against the proposed Blue Stream project, as well as against 
possible gas supplies from Iran. Progress on the TCP (Trans-Caspian) appears stalled at the 
moment, with the international consortium essentially having suspended operations, while Blue 
Stream appears to be proceeding. That is why now the possibility of exporting more of Turkmen 
gas to Russia is discussed.” 1 
Recent information on the progress in building the “Bluestream” pipeline suggests that the 
ENI has finished laying the first of two lines. The second line is expected to be completed by the 
end of 2002 (Anonymous, 2002). No start date for deliveries of gas has been fixed but these 
deliveries are expected to build up to 7 billion cm in 2004 and to reach a plateau of 16 billion cm in 
2007. Turkey’s gas company Botas expects deliveries of 6 billion cm in 2004 and foresee the 
plateau to be reached in 2009) (Quinlan, 2002).   
Against this background the present paper focuses on Turkey. We use a new dynamic model 
described in terms of differential equations to analyze possible scenarios of investments in 
international Turkey-oriented gas pipelines.  The results of the sensitivity analysis give us a better 
understanding of which outcomes of the pipeline projects performance may be most 
sensitive/robust to variation in their parameters and changes on the Turkish gas market. 
                                                 
1
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the input data. Section 3 introduces the 
model. Section 4 presents results of model-and-data-based numerical simulations under different 
optimization scenarios. Section 5 presents results of a numerical sensitivity analysis of the Turkish 
gas market. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Data 
In this paper, we focus attention on five possible gas export pipelines to the Turkey market: 
− “Trans-Balkan”. This is the only currently operational pipeline. Natural gas is delivered via 
Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria to Turkey.  
− “Blue Stream”. This project proposes a direct connection between Russia and Turkey under 
the Black Sea. It will probably be completed in 2002. 
− “Trans-Caspian”. This pipeline is planned to deliver gas from Turkmenistan to Turkey 
through Azerbaijan and Georgia.  
− “Ekarum”. This partially completed pipeline is proposed to import gas from Turkmenistan to 
Iran and then to Turkey.  
− “Iranpipeline”. This pipeline goes directly from Iran. It is an alternative to the “Blue Stream”. 
Table 1 presents the major data on these gas transmission lines. 
Table 1. Data on the Turkey gas market 
Origin: Russia Russia Turkmenistan Turkmenistan Iran 
Name: Trans-Balkan Blue Stream Trans-Caspian Ekarum Iranpipe 
Gas supply 
estimated to start by:  exists 2002 2002 2009 2010 
Percentage 
constructed in 
1998(%) 
100 0 0 54 58 
Final capacity 
(bcm/year) 10.2 14.16 31.15 28.3 28 
Length (miles) 3500 1220 1696 2172 2400 
Investment 
(billion US$) exists 3-4.3 2-3 3.8-4 3.9-4.1 
Transportation costs 
(million US$/bcm) 30 14.1 8 30 30 
Distribution Costs 
(million US$/bcm) 33 33 33 33 33 
Transit fees 
(million US$/bcm) 10 0 16.9 21.6 0 
Some of the data presented in Table 1 were obtained using the IIASA’s MESSAGE model 
(Roehrl et al., 2000). Data for the start year, capacity, length and investment (construction) costs 
are based on EIA (1999a and 1999b), Ignatius (2000) and Zhao (2000). Operation and maintenance 
costs (in our simulations these recurring expenses relate to the transportation costs) are based on 
data of the MESSAGE model and are equal to 10% of the investment (Strubegger and Messner, 
1995). Data for transit fees are estimated on the basis of the existing transit fees from Russia 
through Ukraine and the length of the transit route (Sagers, 1999). Distribution costs include 
domestic distribution and storage costs to the residential, industrial and conversion sectors,  
(Golombek, et al., 1995). We take the averages of these estimates for households and for industry 
and weigh them with the average consumption of gas for these two sectors in Turkey between 1996 
and 1998. This gives an estimate of US$ 33/1000 cm (and a range of 22-57$/1000 cm). 
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The investment costs depend on the time of completing the pipeline, reflecting technical 
progress as observed for on-shore and offshore pipelines (Zhao, 2000). The earlier is the start year, 
the higher are the investment costs. For every year the pipeline is finished later the investment costs 
are lower but at a decreasing rate (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Investment costs as function of the year in which the pipeline will be built (million US$) 
Important components of gas supply are the costs for extraction. We modeled national gas 
supply curves for Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan (CAP) using national data on gas 
reserves and resources and international data on costs (Rogner, 1997). The resulting gas supply 
costs are shown in Figure 3. These data are based on the MESSAGE model taking into account 
domestic demand and export to regions other than Turkey in a dynamics-as-usual scenario. 
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Figure 3. Cumulative gas supply cost curves 
Exogenous domestic gas supply from Turkey (which was only around 0.6 bcm in 2000) is 
ignored for the sake of simplicity. About 30% of natural gas come to Turkey in the form of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG), mainly from Algeria and Nigeria. Therefore, the price for LNG must 
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be taken into account in the analysis of the Turkey gas market. LNG supply is supposed to be 
flexible enough to, in principle, supply the whole Turkish market but only at the world market 
price. The world market price for LNG (see Figure 4) is derived from the IIASA median scenario 
(B2) developed for the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (Nakicenovic, et al., 2000). 
 
Figure 4. The world market price for LNG (US$/1000cm) 
GDP forecasts for Turkey were derived from the B2 scenario (see Figure 5) assuming that 
Turkey would follow the same development path in terms of GDP growth rates per capita as the 
region Middle-East and North Africa (Riahi and Roehrl, 2000).  
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Figure 5. GDP for Turkey (billion US$) 
Using different estimates for the price elasticity  (Komiyama, 2000) we study two central 
cases, A and B.  
Case A assumes a price elasticity of –0.7 and a GDP elasticity of 1.25. The GDP elasticity fits 
with the GDP elasticity in developing countries (see Komiyama, 2000). The price elasticity fits 
with Turkish data and Turkey’s intention to liberalize energy markets. 
Case B assumes a price elasticity of –0.3 and a GDP elasticity of 1.25, which is more in line 
with the evidence for emerging gas markets.  
6 
3. Description of the model 
This section describes the model that was used for the numerical analysis of the Turkish gas 
market using the data presented in the previous section. The model was originally suggested in 
Roehrl et al. (2000) and Matrosov (2000). 
3.1. Objects and parameters 
The main objects in the model (see Figure 6) are a gas market, a collection of gas fields and a 
collection of pipelines connecting the gas fields to the market. The gas market is characterized by 
the GDP level, GDP elasticity of demand, price of gas and price elasticity of demand. Each gas 
field is characterized by the overall cost of delivering a unit of gas to the market.  
The initial period in the lifetime of a gas pipeline project is the period of its construction (the 
investment period). As soon as the accumulated investment reaches the minimum level needed to 
start gas supply, gas is delivered to the market. Generally, a pipeline can supply gas at different 
capacities. The capacity of a pipeline depends on the accumulated capital invested in the project. 
Further investments enlarge the capacity via either building a new pipeline in parallel to the 
existing one, or upgrading the pipeline to a higher pressure. In the model, the goal of every project 
is to maximize profit through regulating the timing of and level of investments, choosing 
appropriate levels of gas supply and finding an optimal time to start exploitation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Schematic outline of the model 
Gas field  1 
(overall costs of 
delivering gas to 
the market) 
Gas market 
Price of 
gas 
GDP 
Price 
elasticity of 
demand 
GDP 
elasticity of 
demand 
Investment into 
pipeline  1 
Investment into 
pipeline  N 
Investment into 
pipeline  2 
Gas field  2 
(overall costs of 
delivering gas to 
the market) 
Gas field  N 
(overall costs of 
delivering gas to 
the market) 
supply supply supply 
7 
The model employs the following set of parameters ( t denotes current time (year)). 
Constants: 
N  the number of the pipelines; 
0t   initial time (time to start investments, common for all pipelines); 
σ   the obsolescence coefficient (one divided by the lifetime);  
γ    the time-delay exponential coefficient. 
 
Parameters of pipeline i ( Ni ,...,1= ): 
iK   the number of capacity levels; 
k
ix   level of the accumulated investment needed to start supply at capacity level  
k ( iKk ,...,0= ); 
k
iM   maximum capacity for capacity level k ( iKk ,...,0= ); 
k
it   time (year) to start exploitation at capacity level k; 
l
it
  final time; 
)(tkir   current investment enlarging capacity from level k-1 to level k; 
)(tix   current accumulated investment; 
)(tiy   current supply; 
)(tiy   current accumulated supply; 
)(tiC   current overall cost of delivering a unit of gas. 
 
Market parameters:  
ey   GDP elasticity of demand; 
ep   price elasticity of demand; 
λ   discount rate;  
G(t)  GDP, national income; 
P(t)  price of gas; 
PLNG(t) price of LNG. 
3.2. Dynamics of investments 
The dynamics of accumulated investments, )(tix , in pipeline i during the investment period 
is described by  
8 
)()()( tirtixtix
γσ +−=& ;  
here  σ  is the obsolescence coefficient (σ >0),  γ  the discount return coefficient (0<γ <1) 
and  )()( tkirtir =  the current investment level in the capacity level  k-1. 
If for pipeline i the times 
k
it
 to start supply at capacity levels i
Kk ,...2,1=
 are fixed 
(published building plans can be used to estimate 
k
it ), the maximization of the profit for pipeline i 
is synonymous to the minimization of its investment cost and maximization of supply. The 
minimum cost for enlarging the pipeline’s capacity from level 1−k  to level k  is found as 
where  0
0 tit =  and λ  is the discount rate. 
An argument from the mathematical control theory yields the following formula for the 
optimal investment policy, )(tkir :  
with 
1−
+
=
α
λασρ  ,   11 >=
γ
α  . 
3.3. Dynamics of gas supply 
For pipeline i, the dynamics of gas supply, )(ty i , at the maximum capacity kiM  for the 
capacity level k is modeled by 
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here Q  is a (large) positive parameter characterizing the ability of the managers of the 
pipeline to regulate supply depending on changes on  the market, and  Ri (t)  is the revenues due to 
sales of gas. A solution to this equation approximates supply for pipeline i at currently emerging 
instantaneous equilibria on the gas market (see Klaassen, et al., 2000).  
If the share of LNG in the gas market is high enough (which is the case for the Turkish 
market), it is necessary to include LNG in the model. We assume that the price for LNG, PLNG(t), 
on the world market is a given function of time. This gives us a similar equation for LNG supply: 
( ) ( ) ( )




−+−+−= )()()()()( tLNGPtPsigntLNGyLNGMsigntLNGysignQtLNGy&
 
where MLNG is the maximum capacity of LNG terminals. The price for LNG serves as an upper 
bound for the price for gas. 
3.4. Price formation mechanism and revenues due to gas sales 
One finds the current price for gas by equalizing the current demand and supply on the gas 
market. Current demand, )(tD , is a function of price, P(t), and GDP, G(t): 
petPy
e
tGAtD
−
= ))(())(()( ; 
here A is a scale coefficient, ey is the GDP elasticity of demand and ep is the price elasticity of 
demand. The current supply, )(tS  is the sum of individual supplies from individual pipelines: 
∑=
N
tiytS 1
)()( . 
Equality )()( tStD =  yields 
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N
tiy
pe
ye
tGpeAtP 1
1
)(
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1
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∑
=     . 
For pipeline i the revenues due to sales of gas, )(tRi , is the product of supply, )(ty i , and the 
difference between the price for gas, P(t), and overall cost for delivering gas to the market, )(tC i : ( ))()()()( tiCtPtiytiR −=  . 
The overall cost for delivering a unit gas is represented as 
)(tC i = ))(( tiy
e
iC + ))(( tiy
t
iC +
f
iC +
d
iC    
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
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where ))(( tiy
e
iC  is the extraction cost, a function of the accumulated supply )(tiy , 
))(( tiy
t
iC  is the transportation cost, a function of supply )(tiy , 
f
iC  is the transit fees and 
d
iC  is the distribution cost. 
3.5. Profits 
For pipeline i the profit )(tU i  is the difference between the revenues, )(tRi , and cost, 
)(tWi : 
)(tU i = )(tRi - )(tWi , 
∑
=
=
)(
1
)()(
tk
k
tkiWtiW , 
 
where )(tk  is the current capacity level. 
4. Simulation results  
To simulate the model described in Section 3 with the data on the Turkish market (see 
Section 2), the software package “Investments in Gas pipelines Optimizing Returns” (IGOR) was 
developed.2 In this section, we present results of a series of IGOR runs using the data for the 
Turkish gas market. The number of new pipelines in the model, N , is 4. Pipelines 1 through 4 are 
“Blue Stream”, “Trans-Caspian”, “Ekarum” and “Iranpipeline” all four of which are either in the 
planning or construction phase.  
For the Cases A and B introduced in Section 2, we consider five scenarios (Table 2) where 
gas supply through a particular new pipeline is either assumed to start as foreseen in current 
business plans or where the time dynamics of gas supply is optimized. Later in this document, we 
will describe these scenarios in more detail. 
Table 2. Five scenarios for commercialization times of new pipelines.  
Pipeline name: “Blue Stream” “Trans-Caspian” “Ekarum” “Iranpipe” 
Scenario 1 As planned (2002) As planned (2002) As planned (2009) As planned (2010) 
Scenario 2 optimized As planned (2002) As planned (2009) As planned (2010) 
Scenario 3 As planned (2002) Optimized As planned (2009) As planned (2010) 
Scenario 4 As planned (2002) As planned (2002) As planned (2009) optimized 
Scenario 5 Nash equilibrium 
Piped gas supply is either assumed to start as foreseen in current business plans (see Table 1) 
or its time dynamics is optimized for profits. Scenario 5 assumes that the projects' 
commercialization times constitute a Nash equilibrium in a game between the projects. 
                                                 
2
 The elaboration of the first version of IGOR and its first runs with the Turkey data are due to Ivan Matrosov 
(2000). 
(12) 
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In each scenario, we use the estimates the investment costs from Table 1 and the other data as 
described in Section 2. Constant A in the expression for price P(t) (subsection 3.4) is set to fit the 
assumed price and GDP elasticities for the year 2000. We use a discount rate of 5%. 
4.1 Case A: Moving toward a liberalized Turkish energy market (high price 
elasticity) 
We recall that Case A is characterized by a price elasticity ey=-0.7 and GDP elasticity ep 
=1.25. As mentioned in Section 2, the assumed value for the GDP elasticity matches with estimates 
for developing/emerging economies, and the price elasticity matches with Turkish data and 
Turkey’s intention to liberalize energy markets. 
4.1.1. Case A, scenario 1: Commercialization times for all pipelines as currently 
planned 
Scenario 1 assumes that each pipeline starts to supply as foreseen by current business plans 
(see Table 1). 
The model results are presented in Figures 7, 8 and 9. Figure 7 shows that the market price 
for gas drops as new projects start supply, and grows only slowly when all the pipelines compete 
on the market. As the Blue Stream and Trans-Caspian terminate their supply (around 2042) and are 
not assumed to be replaced, the price jumps to a higher level and after increases slowly with 
demand to reach its upper bound in 2050. Smaller jumps in price occur before 2045 (e.g. around 
2010) when existing pipelines such as the Transbalkan stop operating. 
 
 
Figure 7. Gas price (US$/1000cm) in Case A, scenario 1 (all pipeline commercialization times as 
currently planned) 
Figure 8 shows the time dynamics of piped gas supply. It shows that the Blue Stream pipeline 
is operating at its maximum capacity while the other pipelines either never reach their maximum 
capacities or reach them at the end of their lifetimes. LNG supply disappears as the Blue Stream 
and Trans-Caspian enter the market and is renewed as these leave the market.  
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Figure 8. Gas supply (bcm/year) in Case A, scenario 1 (all pipeline commercialization times as 
currently planned) 
Figure 9 shows profits per year. Due to a high level of investment costs for the Blue Stream 
pipeline, profits are initially negative. Therefore, Blue Stream returns its investments later than the 
Trans-Caspian pipeline. The Iranpipe looks much better than Ekarum but is less competitive than 
the two other projects, and starts to be profitable only after the termination of Blue Stream and 
Trans-Caspian.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Profits (million US$/year) in Case A, scenario 1 (all pipeline commercialization times as 
currently planned) 
Trans-Balkan 
Iranpipe 
Ekarum Blue Stream 
Transcaspian LNG 
Trans-Balkan 
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4.1.2. Case A, scenario 2: Blue Stream’s commercialization time optimized. 
Other pipelines as planned 
Scenario 2 assumes that the Blue Stream pipeline optimizes its commercialization time, 
assuming that the other pipelines will start to supply according to their current plans. The optimal 
commercialization time for Blue Stream is chosen so as to maximize its total profits at the end of 
its lifetime period. 
Simulations under scenario 2 show that the optimal commercialization time for Blue Stream 
will be around 2005, 3 years later than planned. The rationality of this delay is explained by the fact 
that, as Figure 10 (a) shows, that in this case Blue Stream can start with a higher initial level of 
supply than in 2002 due to a higher GDP level (and hence gas demand) of Turkey. As in scenario 
1, the Blue Stream reaches its maximum capacity in 2030 but maintains this level during a longer 
period. Moreover, in scenario 2 Blue Stream’s cost for construction is lower than in scenario 1. As 
a result, as seen in Figure 10 (b), in scenario 2 Blue Stream’s final profit around 2050 is about 20% 
higher than in scenario 1. 
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      (a) Blue Stream’s gas supply                               (b) Blue Stream’s profit 
Figure 10. Case A, scenario 1 (all pipeline commercialization times as currently planned) and 
scenario 2 (Blue Stream’s commercialization time optimized. Others as planned) 
4.1.3. Case A, scenario 3: Trans-Caspian’s commercialization time optimized. 
Other pipelines as planned 
Scenario 3 assumes that the Trans-Caspian optimizes its commercialization time, whereas all 
the other projects fix their commercialization times as planned. The optimal commercialization 
time for the Trans-Caspian is chosen so as to maximize its total profit at the end of its lifetime 
period. 
Numerical results for scenario 3 show that the optimal commercialization time for the Trans-
Caspian pipeline is around 2010, which is 8 years later than planned. If the Trans-Caspian starts gas 
supply at this optimal time, it reaches its maximum capacity in 2045 and keeps it for 5 years (see 
Figure 11 (a)). Total supply is increased and construction costs reduced, resulting in a total profit 
for the Trans-Caspian pipeline that is about 40% higher if supply starts in 2010 rather than 2002 
(Figure 11 (b)). 
optimized 
as planned  
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                   (a) Trans-Caspian’s gas supply                               (b) Trans-Caspian’s profit 
Figure 11. Case A, scenarios 1 (all pipeline commercialization times as currently planned) and 3 
(Trans-Caspian’s commercialization time optimized. Others as planned) 
4.1.4. Case A, scenario 4: Iranpipe’s commercialization time optimized. Other 
pipelines as planned 
Scenario 4 assumes that the Iranpipe optimizes its commercialization time so as to maximize 
its total profit, whereas all the other projects stick to their currently planned commercialization 
times. Numerical results for scenario 4 show that the optimal commercialization time for Iranpipe 
is around 2010, which agrees with its current plan (see Case A, scenario 1).  
4.1.5. Case A, scenario 5: Nash equilibrium in a game between the pipelines 
Scenario 5 assumes that the projects’ commercialization times constitute a Nash equilibrium 
in a game between the pipeline projects. In this game (see Klaassen, et al., 2001) the pipeline 
projects act as players, projects’ commercialization times are identified with players’ strategies and 
the payoffs to the players are given by the total profits for the corresponding projects. The 
equilibrium presented here was found numerically using an iterative best response procedure.  
The procedure is organized as follows. The entire time interval is split into short subintervals. 
The starting point is the currently planned commercialization times of the players. During the first 
time subinterval, the commercialization time for player 1 is optimized so as to maximize the 
player’s total profit, whereas the commercialization times for the other players are not changed. 
During the second time subinterval, the commercialization time for player 2 is optimized, whereas 
those for the other players are not changed. This algorithm is repeated step by step, each time a 
commercialization time for one player being optimized. If the players’ commercialization times 
eventually converge, their limits are viewed as an approximation to a Nash equilibrium in the 
game. The numerical experiment with the IGOR software showed good convergence. The Nash 
equilibrium set of projects’ commercialization times is shown in Figure 12. Table 3 gives the 
equilibrium times to start gas supply:    
optimized 
as planned  
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Table 3. Optimal commercialization times in the Nash equilibrium. 
Blue Stream Trans-Caspian Ekarum Iranpipe 
2003-2004 2010 2025 2010 
Figure 12 shows that the Nash equilibrium (scenario 5) as compared to scenario 1 (all 
commercialization times as currently planned), implies that it is optimal to delay  building the Blue 
Stream by 1-2 years, the Trans-Caspian by 8 years, and the Ekarum pipeline by 16 years. This is so 
since profits would be higher if these delays are implemented because investment costs would be 
lower and gas demand and revenues higher. The Iranpipe would still proceed as currently planned 
(start in 2010).  
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(c) Gas supply for Trans-Caspian                           (d) Profit for Trans-Caspian 
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(e) Gas supply for Ekarum                                      (f) Profit for Ekarum 
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(g) Gas supply for Iranpipe                                    (h) Profit for Iranpipe 
 
 
Figure 12. Case A, scenarios 1 (all pipeline commercialization times as currently planned) and 5 
(Nash equilibrium) 
4.2. Case B: Parameters as in typical emerging gas markets (lower price 
elasticity) 
Case B is characterized by a lower price elasticity of ey=-0.3 and a GDP elasticity ep =1.25. 
These values are in line with the evidence for emerging gas markets (Komiyama, 2000).  
4.2.1 Case B, scenario 1: Commercialization times for all pipelines as currently 
planned 
In case B where the price elasticity of demand is relatively small (-0.3 instead of -0.7), the 
increase of supply and reduction of the price for gas cannot raise demand substantially. Thus, in 
this case restricting supply and holding the price at a high level can increase profits for each of the 
projects. Therefore, our calculations show that in scenario 1 the price for gas practically coincides 
with the price for LNG (Figure 13).   
Nash equilibrium 
As planned  
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Figure 13. Gas price in Case B, scenario 1 (all commercialization times for all pipelines as 
currently planned) 
In this case, the pipelines share a less abundant market practically uniformly (Figure 14). 
  
Figure 14. Gas supply (bcm/year) in Case B, scenario 1 (all pipeline commercialization times as 
currently planned) 
Figure 15 shows the time dynamics of the pipeline’s profits. 
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Figure 15. Profits (million US$) in Case B, scenario 1 (all pipeline commercialization times as 
currently planned). 
4.2.2. Case B, scenarios 2-5: Commercialization times optimized (various cases) 
Scenarios 2 (Blue Stream optimized), 3 (Trans-Caspian optimized), 4 (Iranpipe optimized) 
and 5 (Nash equilibrium) are defined as in Case A (see 4.1.2-4.1.5). Our computations show that in 
scenarios 2 through 4 the commercialization times for the three optimized projects settle around 
2010. The same holds for the Nash equilibrium scenario 5 (see Figure 16).  In the latter case, it is 
profitable to delay investments and restrict supply so as to keep the gas price at a high level 
determined by the exogenous LNG price.  Consequently, investments costs are lower, prices higher 
and revenues are higher than in the case of implementing the pipelines as planned (compare 
Figures 15 and 16). 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Profits (million US$) in Case B, scenario 5 (Nash equilibrium) 
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5. Sensitivity analyses 
The numerical sensitivity analyses presented in this section analyze how variations in 
discount rate, GDP elasticity of demand and price elasticity of demand influence the performance 
of the proposed pipeline projects. Table 4 lists the respective reference values for these parameters. 
Table 4. Reference values for the sensitivity parameters 
  Parameter Value 
λ discount rate coefficient 0.05 
ey GDP elasticity of demand 1.25 
ep price elasticity of demand 0.7 
We restrict our analysis to scenarios 1 and 5 (see Table 2, page 17). Let us remind that 
scenario 1 assumes that the pipelines’ commercialization times are chosen as currently planned  
and scenario 5 assumes that the pipelines’ commercialization times constitute a Nash equilibrium 
in the game described in subsection 4.1.5. For each experiment, we indicate those model’s outputs 
that are most sensitive to variations of the parameter under consideration. 
5.1. Sensitivity for the GDP elasticity of demand, scenario 1 (all 
commercialization times as currently planned) 
In this numerical experiment we fix all the model’s parameters at their reference values (Case 
A, scenario 1) and vary the GDP elasticity of demand, ey, from the reference value, 1.25, to 3 (the 
maximum value observed in the literature (Komiyama, 2000)). Figure 17 displays the years when 
the pipelines reach their maximum capacities as functions of ey. These functions decrease 
monotonically, which shows that the higher the GDP elasticity, the shorter the projects’ saturation 
periods. As an explanation, we may recall that a higher GDP elasticity implies a higher increase in 
gas demand as the GDP grows. In turn, a higher demand implies higher supply with no essential 
changes in price. Hence, growth in the GDP elasticity results in shortening the saturation periods of 
the pipelines. 
As the GDP elasticity, ey, ranges from 1.25 to 3 the saturation period for each project shrinks 
by around 10 years, which shows its high sensitivity with respect to ey.   
20 
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
1.25 1.5 1.75 2 2.25 2.5 2.75 3
GDP elasticity, ey
Ye
ar
s 
Blue Stream
Trans-Caspian
Ekarum
Iranpipe
 
Figure 17. Years of saturation in Case A, scenario 1 
Figure 18 depicts profits in the year 2050 as functions of ey. These functions are 
monotonically increasing, which shows that profits are positively related to the GDP elasticity. 
An explanation is that, as noted earlier, growth in ey implies growth in supply. Figure 18 shows 
that projects with higher capacities are more sensitive to variations in ey. 
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Figure 18. Projects’ profits in 2050 for Case A, scenario 1 
5.2. Sensitivity of the results for the price elasticity of demand, scenario 1 (all 
commercialization times as currently planned) 
In the next experiment, we vary the price elasticity of demand, ep, from -0.3 to the reference 
value, -0.7. All other parameters are fixed at their reference values. Figure 19 presents price for gas 
in the year 2020 as a function of ep. This function decreases, which can be explained as follows. If 
the price elasticity, ep, is low, price has little influence on demand. Hence, the projects do not 
compete actively, but withhold new pipeline capacity to keep the price at a high level. As a result, 
the price for gas follows its upper bound, the price for LNG.  As price elasticity grows, the projects 
start to compete and the price for gas drops.  
21 
0
50
100
150
200
250
0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7
Price elasticity, ep
Pr
ic
e 
(m
ln
 
US
$/b
cm
)
 
Figure 19. Price for gas in 2020 in Case A, scenario 1 
Figure 20 presents profits in the year 2050 as functions of the price elasticity of demand, ep. 
We see that for small ep the profits grow together with ep. Starting from a certain critical ep  (around 
0.45) profits decrease as ep continues to grow. To explain this phenomenon, we can address the fact 
that, generally, the increase in the price elasticity implies an increase in supply. Hence, if the 
market competition is not clearly seen (which, as noted above, corresponds to low enough ep) the 
increase in ep enlarges profits due to the increase in supply. The critical value of ep  can be viewed 
as a saturation point, at which price and supply reach their highest limits and competition between 
the projects not only decreases the price while increasing supply but also lowers the net profits. 
Figure 20 shows that the profitability of Blue Stream becomes higher as the price elasticity, ep, 
grows but only up to a level of 0.45. 
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Figure 20. Project's profits in 2050 for Case A, scenario 1 
5.3. Sensitivity of the results for changes in the discount rate, scenario 1 (all 
commercialization times as currently planned) 
In the next numerical experiment, we fix all the model’s parameters at their reference values 
(Case A, scenario 1) and vary the discount rate, λ, from 0.02 to 0.07. Figure 21 presents profits in 
the year 2050 as functions of λ. These functions are rapidly decreasing, which shows that profits 
22 
are highly sensitive to changes in the discount rate. Blue Stream and Trans-Caspian appear to be 
less sensitive than the Ekarum and Iranpipe. 
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Figure 21. Net value of discounted projects’ profits in the year 2050 for Case A, scenario 1 
5.4. Sensitivity for GDP elasticity of demand, scenario 5 (Nash equilibrium) 
For scenario 5, we analyze the sensitivity of the projects’ equilibrium commercialization 
times with respect to changes in the GDP elasticity of demand, price elasticity of demand and 
discount coefficient.  
Figure 22 shows the projects’ equilibrium commercialization times for different values of the 
GDP elasticity, ey. We see that the Trans-Caspian, Iranpipe and Blue Stream are not sensitive to ey, 
while Ekarum is very sensitive. For the Blue Stream the equilibrium time to start supply changes 
from approximately 2003 to approximately 2005 as ey grows from 1.25 to 3. To explain this, we 
may note once again that the increase in the GDP elasticity implies, generally, an increase in supply 
and, consequently, in profit. This also implies that it becomes profitable for the other pipelines to 
start supply earlier leading to a delay for the “Blue Stream”. This is especially the case for Ekarum, 
for which the equilibrium commercialization time changes from 2025 to 2017 as ey grows from 
1.25 to 3.     
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Figure 22. Sensitivity of commercialization times in Case A, scenario 5 (Nash equilibrium) 
5.5. Sensitivity for price elasticity of demand, scenario 5 (Nash equilibrium) 
Figure 23 presents the projects’ equilibrium commercialization times as functions of the price 
elasticity, ep. As ep approaches its lower bound, -0.3, the equilibrium commercialization times 
concentrate around 2009, and they differ significantly (see the right hand side of Figure 23) when 
ep approaches its upper bound, -0.7. To explain this phenomenon, we may argue as follows. If the 
price elasticity is relatively low, the projects can share the market more or less equally; hence, 
under the equilibrium scenario, they commercialize simultaneously, at a later time (so as to reduce 
the construction costs), and supply gas at a high price. At higher values of the price elasticity  
competition becomes more intense and  this cooperative commercialization strategy of sharing the 
market does no longer lead to an equilibrium. For the Blue Stream it becomes profitable to start 
supply earlier and for Ekarum later. It is remarkable that for the Trans-Caspian and Iranpipe the 
equilibrium commercialization times are quite insensitive to variations in ep.      
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Figure 23. Sensitivity of commercialization times in Case A, scenario 5 (Nash equilibrium). 
5.6. Sensitivity for the discount rate, scenario 5 (Nash equilibrium) 
Figure 24 shows the projects’ equilibrium commercialization times computed for different 
values of the discount rate, λ. We see that as λ increases, the equilibrium commercialization times 
tend to decrease for the Blue Stream and Trans-Caspian but tend to increase for the Ekarum 
pipeline. Only for a very high discount rate (0.15) commercialization of the Blue Stream would be 
delayed until 2030 and the Trans-Caspian would be built already in 2005. This is due to the high 
initial investments of the Blue Stream.  
Figure 24. Sensitivity of commercialization times for Case A, scenario 5 (Nash equilibrium). 
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6. Conclusions 
We have presented results of a numerical analysis of the international gas pipeline routings to 
the Turkey market, including comprehensive sensitivity analyses. For this purpose, a new 
economic model of the performance of international gas pipeline projects has been recently 
developed by IIASA’s DYN/ECS projects. The model was based on the new DYN-elaborated 
IGOR software package and ECS data for the Turkey gas market. 
Assuming a future move toward a liberalized Turkish energy market (i.e., assuming a high 
price elasticity of -0.7), the (optimal) Nash equilibrium solution implies that the “Blue Stream” 
pipeline project would start gas supply by 2003/2004, the “Trans-Caspian” pipeline by 2010 and 
the “Iranpipe” by 2010. However, assuming no significant liberalization, i.e., assuming a lower 
price elasticity (-0.3), all optimal pipeline commercialization times are delayed until 2010. The 
optimal commercialization time of the “Blue Stream” pipeline is very sensitive to the price 
elasticity and discount rate and less sensitive to the assumed GDP elasticity. The optimal timing of 
the “Trans-Caspian” pipeline is rather insensitive to all three factors. The “Iranpipe” pipeline is 
more sensitive to the discount rate. The “Ekarum” pipeline, being the least profitable of all four 
new pipeline projects, is very sensitive to all three factors. 
For investors our central case with a high gas price elasticity and moderate GDP elasticity of 
gas demand shows that the Blue stream pipeline should indeed (as is the case in reality) be the first 
one to be built. Commercialization of the Transcaspian pipeline and the pipeline from Iran is only 
viable financially around 2010. This result holds for different GDP elasticities. Only when the price 
elasticity is lower than –0.5 commercialization of the Blue stream should be delayed beyond 2005. 
The same applies when the interest rate would be 15%. Building the Blue stream seems to be a 
robust first choice. If the other investors want to maximize profits commercialization of their 
pipelines may have to wait until the year 2010. 
Future research should address more directly the issues of economic and political risks. The 
current model structure is ideal to include these risk factors. An extension of the model could 
address the possibility of substitution between gas and other fuels (oil, coal, renewables etc.), 
possibly by linking IGOR to available energy models. Finally, the model could be applied to other 
regions or a multimarket/multiregional version of the model could be made to address interactions 
between different markets in Eurasia.  
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Appendix 
This Section describes the software package IGOR that was used to match the model 
described in section 3 with the data on the Turkish market. The IGOR package includes an input 
interface, several computing modules and an output module that simulates a gas market for user-
defined input data and displays various output parameters in a user-friendly way. Table A shows 
the basic inputs and outputs for IGOR. 
 
 
 
 
Table A. Inputs and outputs for IGOR 
Inputs Outputs 
 
Initial time, T0 
 
Price for gas, P 
Final time, TEND 
Step, DELT 
 
 
STATE OF PIPELINE I 
Number of pipelines, N 
Initial price for gas, P0 
 
Accumulated investment, X[I] 
Current investment, U[I]  
STATE OF ENVIRONMENT Current supply, Y[I] 
Accumulated supply, YY[I]  
Gross Domestic Product, GDP Commercialization level, CL[I]  
Upper reference price of gas, PLNG Profit, B[I] 
Discount coefficient, λ  
Obsolescence coefficient, σ  
Discount return coefficient, γ  
Price elasticity of gas demand, ep  
GDP elasticity of gas demand, ey  
 
INITIAL STATE OF PIPELINE I  
Initial accumulated investment, X0[I]  
Initial current supply, Y0[I]  
Initial accumulated supply, YY0[I]  
Initial commercialization level, CL0[I]   
Initial profit, B0[I]  
OTHER INITIAL DATA FOR PIPELINE I  
Number of capacities, K[I]  
Lifetime, TL[I]  
Commercialization times,  
Input:  
State of environment & 
initial data 
IGOR Output:  
State of pipelines 
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COMT[I,1],…,COMT[I,K[I]] 
Project capacities, 
PM[I,1],…,PM[I,K[I]] 
 
Extraction costs, CE[I]   
Transportation costs, CT[I]  
Distribution costs, CD[I]  
Transit fees, CF[I]  
 
Figure A1 shows the basic scheme of IGOR. The next blocks compute basic outputs: 
CURRENT INVESTMENT realizes scenarios to compute current investment for a pipeline; 
CURRENT SUPPLY computes current supply for a pipeline; 
ACCUMULATED INVESTMENT (SUPPLY) computes accumulated investment (supply) for 
a pipeline; 
ENVIRONMENT GENERATOR defines current parameters of the environment; 
COST GENERATOR defines current costs of extraction, transportation costs, distribution 
costs and transit fees for a pipeline. 
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Figure A2 shows the IGOR discrete data input window, using which the user introduces 
discrete input parameters such as the number of commercialization levels, maximum capacities, 
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Figure A1. Block-scheme of IGOR 
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costs, etc., as well as the initial states of the pipelines and the environment (including the initial 
GDP, price for LNG, price and GDP elasticity of demand).  Another window is used to introduce 
the table data.  
 
Figure A2. IGOR discrete input data window. 
Simulation results are presented as a table or as a chart. The “Chart output” and “Table 
output” windows allow the user to view a selected output variable for a selected set of projects 
(Figure A3 gives an illustration). The results can be saved.  
Figure A3. An IGOR output (an example). 
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